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WHEN RETREAT IS THE BEST OPTION:
FLOOD INSURANCE AFTER BIGGERTWATERS AND OTHER CLIMATE CHANGE
PUZZLES
ROBERT

R.M. VERCHICK*

LYNSEY
I.

R. JOHNSON**

INTRODUCTION

Commentators argue, with good reason, that flood risk polices
are soft on retreat.' We Americans are more interested in
fortifying our castles or building them higher than in moving out
of harm's way. And that is despite warnings of rising seas and
stronger storms associated with climate change. 2 But the impulse
to stay put may be eroding. In particular, the practices and
policies of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
are gradually encouraging retreat over other alternatives. As one
example, FEMA's current Mitigation Best Practice Database, the
agency's new National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF),
now contemplates retreat mechanisms. These developments are
significant, but could benefit from a uniform set of principles to
guide them. For a while, Congress, too, beat the drums of retreat.
The Biggert-Waters Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12),3
promised to remove important insurance subsidies for flood-prone

* Gauthier-St. Martin Chair in Environmental Law, Loyola University New

Orleans; Senior Fellow, Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy, Tulane
University. The authors are grateful for any comments or suggestions. Please
send them to: verchick@loyno.edu.
** J.D. candidate, Class of 2014, Loyola University New Orleans; Ms. Johnson
served as Disaster Response and Recovery Planner for the State of Wisconsin
from 2007 until 2011.
1. See, e.g., Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to
Address Transitory and Perpetual Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism
Framework, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1991, 2002-03 (2011) (discussing St. Louis,
Missouri's retreat options); Lisa Grow Sun, Smart Growth in Dumb Places:
Sustainability,Disaster,and the Future of the American City, 2011 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 2157, 2160-61 (2011).
2. THE NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 2013 (DRAFT) 8,

available at http://www.globalchange.gov/resources/reports [hereinafter "NCA
2013 (Draft)"].
3. Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 958 (2012).
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homes, forcing some residents to consider relocation as a costsaving option. Two years later, in response to public backlash,
Congress repealed the law's strongest retreat-based incentives.
For reasons we'll discuss, that's probably just as well. But retreat
as a tool of insurance reform is not likely to recede, nor should it.
Congress is statutorily bound to revisit the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) by 2017. Given the projected rise in
flood events across the country and NFIP's multi-billion dollar
deficit, Congress cannot forego retreat as an option. But it must do
a much better job shaping the incentives and making them fair.
In this article, we consider retreat as a strategy of hazard-risk
reduction, with reference to the developments in FEMA practice
and policy listed above. As global warming increases the risk of
floods and other extreme events, we also see FEMA's evolving
retreat strategies as an important part of the nation's climate
adaptation efforts. Unfortunately, initiatives like the new NDRF
and Congress's insurance reforms are developing piecemeal, with
blind spots large enough to drive a tornado through. We believe
that policy makers would do better to have a set of principles to
guide them when considering and implementing strategies that
are intended or will have the effect of encouraging retreat. In
particular, we think that Congress could have avoided the
embarrassing failure of BW-12 if lawmakers had more fully
recognized the complex issues at stake in retreat-based policies.
One aim of our analysis is to suggest what a successful reform of
the NFIP might look like, setting the foundation for more detailed
conversations about flood insurance as the 2017 deadline
approaches.
We make our case in four parts. First, we define retreat policy
in the context of the broader climate change problem, particularly
the challenge of adapting to flood-related disasters caused by
global warming. Second, we offer a set of principles to guide
decision makers in shaping and implementing retreat-based
initiatives as an adaptive solution. Third, we identify some ways
that FEMA appears to be encouraging retreat-based options,
paying special attention to the NDRF and to Congress's flip-flop on
In that part, we then evaluate these
insurance reform.
developments under our recommended principles. We conclude
that while reforms in disaster policy should be praised for opening
up a discussion on managed retreat, there is still a long way to go.

II. RETREAT AND THE CLIMATE TOOLBOX
A. The Challenge
Climate change has become our largest environmental

When Retreat is the Best Option

2014]

697

problem. The phenomenon, caused mainly by human activity, 4 is
increasing average temperatures, disrupting rain patterns,
elevating the seas, and juicing up storm cycles.5 In short, global
warming is shaping a future that promises to be a lot hotter,
wetter, drier, and weirder.
B. Options for Adaptation
Of course, people have always adapted to changes in climate.
They resist. They adjust. Or they retreat. These strategies make
up the basic "climate toolbox," now being deployed, with
tremendous energy and innovation, to adapt to climate change.6
Resistance might refer to coastal engineering activities that reduce
the risk of flooding, erosion, or inundation of land and structures.
Adjustment refers to the many ways that communities have
learned to live with excess water, heat, or other stressors. On the
coast, it might involve elevating buildings in flood-prone areas. In
the desert, it might require building codes that emphasize passive
cooling technologies and the capture and reuse of rainwater.
Retreat involves the migration of people, property,
businesses, and perhaps wildlife. Its goal is to minimize hazards
and environmental impacts by removing development (or animal
habitat) from the most vulnerable areas. In its most extreme form,
retreat means abandoning development that cannot reasonably be
protected or serviced in another way.7 But retreat can also mean
imposing limits, such as restricting development in existing
communities or prohibiting development in sensitive undeveloped
landscapes.8 Although in this article we address retreat in the
context of flood-prone communities, the strategy might also be
considered in forested areas susceptible to wild fire or desert towns
parched by drought.

4.

U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENDANGERMENT AND

CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE
FINDINGS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER SECTION 202(A) OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT; FINAL RULE, 74 FED. REG. 66496, 66497 (Dec. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment
(relying
on
scientific
assessments by the U.S. Global Change Research Program, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and the National Research
Council).
5. NCA 2013 (Draft), supra note 2, at 8.
6. Robert R.M. Verchick & Joel Scheraga, Protecting the Coast, in THE
LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: UNITED STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 5-7 (Michael B. Gerard and Katrina Kuh, eds., 2012).
7. See ANNE SIDERS, MANAGED COASTAL RETREAT: A LEGAL HANDBOOK
ON SHIFTING DEVELOPMENT AWAY FROM VULNERABLE 19 (2013), available at
http://web.law.columbia.edulsites/default/files/microsites/climatechange/files/Publications/ManagedCoastalRetreatFINAlOct%2030.pdf.
(noting that typically governments are reluctant to employ retreat).
8. See id. at 85 (positing that if governments are not careful, building
restrictions could constitute a taking under the 5th amendment).
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C. Retreat as an Option
The option of retreat has much to recommend it. It is
precautionary, meaning it minimizes place-based risks that
threaten uncertain harm to public safety and the natural
environment. It maximizes investment by minimizing the need to
respond to or recover from place-based disaster. It serves other
related interests, including the avoidance of sprawl and the ethical
desire to live consistently with the natural world.9 But there are
disadvantages too. Retreat can be expensive, particularly where
government bears the cost of buying out owners or providing space
for relocation. When residents and businesses leave, local
governments lose tax revenue. Owners on the coast or river
shorelines also pack political clout and may resist efforts to drive
them away.' 0 Existing laws, designed to promote opportunity and
stability in ownership, also make it hard to keep or move people
out. (As one example, consider the parade of post-Kelo reforms in
state eminent domain law, designed to protect residents from
forced buyouts.)" There are technical difficulties too. The extreme
consequences of relocation would seem to require a convincing
scientific case for climate risk. But there is still a lot that
scientists don't know about the effects of climate on precipitation
patterns and regional hydrology. The scientific debate about the
effect of global warming on storms continues without firm
conclusions.12 Finally, efforts to keep people out or relocate them
are highly susceptible to discriminatory motives and disparate
impacts. History is replete with cautionary examples, from the
aftermath of the 1928 Okeechobee flood to the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina.' 3

9. See Rose A. Kob, Riding the Momentum of Smart Growth: The Promise
of Eco-Development and Environmental Democracy, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 139,
151 (2000) (decrying the evils of sprawl); Jedediah Purdy, American Natures:
The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36 HARV. ENvT'L. L. REV. 169,
210 (2012) (praising development that is consistent with the natural world).
10. See VICKI BEEN, Lucas v. the Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause
to Promote More Efficient Regulations, in PROPERTY STORIES 299, 301-02
(Gerald Corngold & Andrew Morriss, eds., 2d ed., 2009) (discussing the story
of David Lucas).
11. DANIEL A. FARBER, JIM CHEN, ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, AND LISA
GROw SUN, DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 357-363 (2d ed. 2009).
12. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 72-73 (Lenny Bernstein et al. eds., 2008),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdflassessment-reportlar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf
(noting that climate change is a certainty, but exactly how climate will change
is uncertain).
13. See ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 107-11 (2010) (discussing the
discriminatory effects of disaster throughout U.S. history).
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II. SOME PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGED RETREAT

With these concerns in mind, we recommend some principles
that should be used to evaluate policies or individual decisions
that encourage retreat.
A. FirstPrinciple
The federal government should play an active role in largerscale retreat efforts. The need for government involvement in
hazard mitigation was recognized as early as 1755 when the
Portuguese imposed seismic building codes after the great Lisbon
earthquake. 14 Today, government participates at all stages of
disaster policy, from planning to emergency response to recovery.
Frequently, that work is guided or supported by federal agencies.
But federal officials have been reluctant to involve themselves
very directly in retreat efforts.' 5 Given the particularized
knowledge required and local interests at stake, that's
understandable. But where larger-scale retreat efforts are
involved, federal participation is required to provide the services
that state and local governments cannot. In the era of climate
change, one significant service is the provision of climate
projections and other scientific information necessary to
understand local risk. Funding is another resource. A third way
the federal government can help is in helping to control transborder spillover effects of retreat strategies-situations where
residents or jobs leave one state or region for another. Price
signals in the marketplace are not enough. Government should
play a role in developing risk-based information (like accurate
flood maps), communicating risk in accessible ways to the public,
designating or assembling land to receive new populations, and
facilitating the transfer or development of needed infrastructure to
receiving areas. Minority and low-income communities often bear
the brunt of relocation efforts, particularly where important
decisions are left to market forces.' 6
B. Second Principle
Decisions about and implementation of retreat options must be
based on sound science. Where significant uncertainties exist,
decisions should employ decision-making tools designed for
contexts in which all facts cannot be known or easily predicted.
Decision makers should seek flexibility and avoid path dependence.
This principle addresses the role of uncertainty in risk
assessment-a significant challenge where future climate impacts
are concerned. One way to combat uncertainty is through better
information. Every year scientists get better at projecting future
14. Id. at 1.
15. See SIDERS, supra,note 7, at 2.
16. VERCHICK, supra note 13, at 136-39.
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average temperatures, downscaling climate impact models, and
understanding local hydrology. Those efforts must continue. The
insight they provide must be communicated in ways that are
accessible to decision makers and the public. But there is a limit to
how accurate scientific information can be in an area as complex
as climate change. Dealing with large residual uncertainties will
require new ways of assessing and managing risk. Traditional
cost-benefit analysis, so dependent on ball-park probabilities, to be
of value, may have to give way to multiple-scenario planning or
explicit precautionary assumptions.17 Uncertainty also requires a
willingness to be flexible and to choose options that minimize the
8
possibility of future regret.'
C. Third Principle
The choice of retreat as an option, its design, and
implementation must come from a process with fair and robust
public participation.This is so whether or not retreat is offered as a
voluntary choice, is encouraged, or is legally mandated. Because
retreat involves interests so central to one's life, job, family, and
community, public participation is key to any acceptable outcome.
This is particularly so where science and probabilities do not point
to any obvious course of action. Robust public participation will
also insure that important local information and values are
integrated into policy making.
D. Fourth Principle
Managed retreat should emphasize the needs of socially
vulnerable populations; these include low-income and minority
populations, children, the elderly, the disabled, and other similar
groups. Planners should early on identify populations of concern
and consider how a managed retreat option would affect them
positively or negatively. In developing a retreat and relocation
plan, decision makers should think not just about avoiding undue
harm to vulnerable groups, but also how to improve their baseline
status in the receiving area.
E. Fifth Principle
Plans for retreat and relocation should be developed with
involvement from both the retreatingcommunity and the receiving
communities in order to insure fair and workable transitions.
Ideally, retreating and receiving communities should be located
within the relevant jurisdictional lines to preserve the existing tax
base and existing service flows (education, medical care, public
transportation, and so on). Fulfilling this principle will often

17.
18.

VERCHICK, supra note 13, at 216-22, 246-49.
Id.
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require agreements between neighboring jurisdictions or
involvement from a higher level of government such as the state or
the federal government.
F. Sixth Principle
Managed retreat should not create other significant
adaptation challenges in other geographic areas and should not
significantly conflict with the goals of climate mitigation. In an era
rife with uncertainty, unintended consequences are bound to pop
up; but we should avoid them when we can. Removing residents
from a flood plain does no good if that leads to exurban
development near forests prone to wildfire. And don't forget that
any new development will expand the community's carbon
footprint. The point is not to eliminate the downside, but to
identify it beforehand and minimize it. Of course, if a retreat plan
ultimately causes more trouble than it solves, it should be
reconsidered. Assessments like this will sometimes require looking
beyond the jurisdiction directly involved to avoid trans-boundary
spillovers.
III. FEMA HEADS FOR THE HILLS
A. Recent History
Many of FEMA's earlier managed-retreat efforts have been
completed on an ad hoc basis. Projects can best be described as a
patchwork. Before any hazard mitigation planning or other
coordinated efforts, most managed-retreat projects were
implemented only as local, state, and federal funds became
available. After a disaster, many communities would unspool
projects without rhyme, reason, or plan.
Almost always, the relocation of developed arrears is first
spurred by local and state governments. The federal government,
after all, does not sweep into disaster-torn communities,
demanding forced relocation. The federal government does offer
incentives, but the impetus for managed retreat, especially before
formalized federal grant programs, must come from the
community itself. And many communities work diligently to
reduce the number of structures in the floodplains.
Several communities stand out in their efforts. Birmingham,
Alabama; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Fargo, North Dakota; and even a tiny
town like Gays Mills, Wisconsin, have all used managed retreat to
nearly eliminate disaster losses in their respective communities.
Many of these projects used FEMA mitigation funds to assist in
project completion. Birmingham successfully removed 735
structures from the floodplain over a 20 year-period. 19 In
19.

FED.

Analysis:

EMERGENCY

MGT.

Acquisition

AGENCY,

Successes

Acquisition, Evaluation, and

in

Birmingham,
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cooperation with the state and federal government, the city
returned the floodplain to its natural function of flood retention
and simultaneously saved property and lives in the process. 20
Tulsa also used a combination of federal, state, and local funding
to acquire over 100 homes in the floodplain and reverted the area
to park and a water detention site. 21
Perhaps one of the most tested managed retreat projects
occurred along the Sheyenne and Red Rivers in North Dakota.22
From the 1970s to 2011, the city of Fargo acquired 200 properties
along the rivers, funded by federal grants and a half-cent sales tax
approved in 2009.23 Recent record floods have illustrated to the
city and the nation the value of managed retreat. 24 Currently, the
city is working to acquire another 140 homes in the rivers'
floodplain. 25
Even the smallest of towns can implement managed retreat
techniques. The village of Gays Mills, with a population of
approximately 500 people, was able to pull together and relocate
their community out of a floodplain. 26 After two 500-year flood
events within 10 months, the citizens felt it was the time to move
to higher ground.27 Roughly 33 homes were removed from the
floodplain using FEMA and state funds. 28 Many other federal,
state, and local funds were used to relocate businesses, private
residences, and government buildings. 29
The National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
highlights two communities that have employed coastal managed
retreat strategies. 0 The city of Pacifica, California used a strategy
that combined "soft" stabilization techniques to enhance a fish
habitat, reduce flooding threats and preserve the beach. In
addition, they chose to remove vulnerable structures along the
https://www.lis.dhs.gov/content/acquisition-evaluation-and-analysisacquisition-successes-birmingham (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
20. Id.
21. FED. EMERGENCY MGT. AGENCY, Acquisition of Floodprone Structures,
https://www.11is.dhs.gov/content/acquisition-floodprone-structures (last visited
Jan. 15, 2014).
22. FED. EMERGENCY MGT. AGENCY, North Dakota City Combines Multiple
Mitigation Measures, https://www.lis.dhs.gov/content/north-dakota-citycombines-multiple-mitigation-measures (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. WISCONSIN EMERGENCY MGT., Moving a Town: The Story of Gays
Mills, http://www.slideshare.net/WAFSCM/moving-a-town-the-story-of-gaysmills (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. NATL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, Managed Retreat
Strategies,
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/initiatives/shoreline-pprretreat.html
(last visited August 9, 2013).
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beach. The city of Ventura, California, chose a strategy which
removed existing riprap, restored the beach to its natural habitat,
provided for on-going beach re-nourishment, and advocated for the
removal of the nearby dam. 31 The Ventura officials found it
difficult to convince others that planned retreat would be the best
economic and environmental solution to the community's
problems. 32 A change in leadership at one key agency helped push
the managed retreat alternative.33
In late 2004, FEMA endorsed a more holistic approach to
managed retreat.34 Emergency Support Function (ESF) #14:
Long-Term Community Recovery was a support function of the
National Response Framework (NRF) that coordinated the
resources of federal departments and agencies to support longterm recovery of States and communities. 35 The primary goal was
to reduce or eliminate risk from future incidents.36 ESF #14 was
FEMA's first real attempt to address the "whole" community with
a focused recovery process. 37 The Emergency Support Function
#14 no longer exists within the current NRF. However in 2013,
FEMA released a stand-alone document, the National Disaster
Recovery Framework (NDRF), which speaks directly to a holistic
approach to recovery, mitigation, and managed retreat.3 8
B. Current Efforts

FEMA has recently revised some policies in ways that
promote managed retreat.
Consider its updated policies
concerning the acquisition and removal of floodplain properties
that are substantially damaged. Before the FY13 Hazard
Mitigation Assistance (HMA) program guidance, communities
could only use a "Substantial Damage" waiver for the
acquisition/demolition of properties under HMGP.39 It was a
stand-alone policy memo that was not incorporated into program
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34.

FED.

EMERGENCY

MGMT.

AGENCY,

Long

Term

Recovery,

http://www.fema.gov/long-term-recovery (last updated June 14, 2012).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37.

Id.

38. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, National Disaster Recovery
Framework, http://www.fema.gov/national-disaster-recovery-framework (last
updated May 9, 2013) [hereinafter National Disaster Recovery Framework].
39.

FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, Hazard Mitigation Assistance

Unified Guidance: Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Pre-DisasterMitigation
Program, and Flood Mitigation Assistance Program 102 (July 12, 2013),
http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/15463cb34a2267a900bde4774c3f42e4/FINAL_Guidance_081213_508.pdf.
Damage of any origin sustained by a building whereby the cost of restoring the
building to its before-damaged condition would equal or exceed 50 percent of
the market value of the building before the damage occurred. Id.
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guidance. In contrast, the 2013 HVIA guidance includes and
expands the policy for all mitigation programs (PDM, HMGP, and
FMA). Specifically, the policy provides for an "expedited costeffectiveness methodology available for property acquisition
projects when certain conditions are met".40 Structures that are
declared "Substantially Damaged" as a result of riverine flooding
in a Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) are considered cost
effective for acquisition projects.4 '
Congress began wiring retreat measures into the National
Flood Insurance Program as early as 1994. The 1994 Reform Act
added the Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) provision, which
"encourages enforcement of the 50% Substantial Damage rule by
providing funds to be used for eleva[tion]" or acquisition. 42 The
1994 Reform Act also added the Community Rating System (CRS).
This provision is meant to promote and encourage communities to
reduce NFIP claims.43 By employing managed retreat, along with
other floodplain management techniques, a community can help
reduce premiums for policyholders in the community. 44
Unfortunately, these two provisions are not readily used.
Communities generally do not want to bother with CRS
requirements and insurance agents do not want to deal with ICC
claims.
C. The NationalDisasterRecovery Framework
1. Description
In 2013, FEMA rolled out its national framework for disaster
recovery, the NDRF.45 The document sets guidelines for state
It provides a process by which
disaster-recovery plans. 46
communities can collaborate to "restore, redevelop and
revitalize . .. its .. . health, social, economic, [and] natural and
environmental fabric." 47 The NDRF defines core recovery
principles, roles and responsibilities for officials and an overall
process by which communities can rebuild safer, stronger, and
most importantly, smarter. 48
The NDRF includes six Recovery Support Functions (RSFs),
which are similar to the "emergency" support functions in the
40. Id. at 48.
41. Id. at 48-49.
42. Extension Disaster Education Network, National Flood Insurance
Reforms,
and
Program
http://eden.1su.edu/Topics/Hazards/Floods/NFIPIPages/NationalFloodlnsuranc
e(NFIP).aspx (last updated Apr. 3, 2013).

43. Id.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
NationalDisasterRecovery Framework,supra note 38.
Id.
Id.

48. Id.
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The RSFs include community planning, economic
NRF.
development, health and social services, housing, infrastructure
systems, and natural and cultural resources.4 9 These functions
encompass the core recovery capabilities of the federal
departments, state agencies, local governments, non-profits, and
other key stakeholders.50 The NDRF's goal is to bring together all
resources into a one-stop-shop for a community's recovery needs.
At its core, the NDRF is designed to help communities pre-plan to
insure that their values and community vision are not lost after a
disaster. It is imperative that managed retreat principles and
mitigation be considered in the pre-planning process.
2. Evaluation
In evaluating the NDRF against our six managed retreat
principles, the NDRF addresses some, but not all. The NDRF
misses key opportunities to provide communities with sound
managed retreat and mitigation options. Specifically, the NDRF
does a good job in addressing how government should play a role
in large-scale retreat efforts, encouraging public participation and
emphasizing the needs of socially-vulnerable populations.
However, the NDRF does not provide for the input of neighboring
communities, including those that could be on the receiving end of
a relocation plan. In addition, the framework does not devote
enough attention to potential spillover effects outside the
jurisdiction.
The framework does an excellent job discussing how to
encourage government to spearhead the recovery at all levels. It
suggests that depending on the size of the disaster, the levels of
government participation may vary. For larger scale events, the
state and federal government may operate through a Joint Field
Office (JFO)51 to coordinate valuable recovery resources. 52
Additionally, the NDRF is strong in its discussion of public
participation.
The framework focuses on community-centric
technical assistance teams that work with the citizens.53 Further,
the NDRF calls for all community perspectives to be represented
in the phases of recovery planning. 54 Key to any public planning
process is transparency and accountability, which needs to occur

49. FED. EMERGENCY MGT. AGENCY, National Disaster Recovery
Framework: StrengtheningDisaster Recovery for the Nation 37 (July 13, 2013),
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1820-250455325/508_ndrf.pdf.
50. Id.
51. FED. EMERGENCY MGT. AGENCY, supra note 49, at 42. A Joint Field
Office is operational after a Presidentially-declared disaster and houses both
the state and federal government agencies to aid in disaster recovery. Id.
52. FED. EMERGENCY MGT. AGENCY, supra note 49, at 25-26.
53. Id. at 47.
54. Id. at 15.
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early and often.5 5 Finally, the framework suggests that public
information should to be accessible to keep all citizens informed
through the recovery process.56 Quality public participation is
essential in legitimizing any project, especially managed retreat
efforts.
Another managed retreat principle that is evident in the
NDRF is an emphasis on the needs of socially vulnerable
populations. The framework clearly explains to communities how
to involve these populations in the planning process. 5 7 It also
identifies pertinent acts and Executive Orders which communities
should be mindful of during the planning process.58
Unfortunately, the NDRF lacks when evaluating against the
sound science principle. Overall, science and technology are
notably absent from the document. The framework discusses
adaptability at a high level but does not go any further.59 While it
is widely understood that the NDRF is a planning guidance
document, it misses an opportunity to suggest ideas and ways for
communities to adapt. The framework uses key buzzwords like
"resilience" and "adaptability" without giving concrete examples.
In situations were small communities attempt to implement the
framework on its own, these lack of examples may prove
problematic. Another critique of the NDRF is that the Housing
RSF does not discuss the idea of managed retreat. Overall, the
Housing RSF only addresses immediate housing needs rather than
examining essential citizen long-term housing needs.60
Finally, the NDRF is silent on two of our identified managed
retreat principles. It does not address the receiving communities
nor does it consider the possibility of causing new problems
elsewhere. It is important than when planning long-term recovery,
it is not done in a bubble. Floods and other disasters do not
recognize political boundaries. It is important to involve adjacent
communities in the planning process, whether it is response or
recovery planning.
The NDRF is a good start but does have room for
improvement when considering managed retreat principles. In
future revisions of the framework guidance, it benefits both
communities and state and federal agencies to address the key
managed retreat principles, especially when deciding the best
course of recovery for a community.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 71-75.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 55-57.
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D. The Biggert Waters Flood InsuranceReform Act of 2012
1. Description
a. Flood Insurance before the 2012 Reform
Created in 1968, the NFIP offers federal flood insurance to
property owners in communities that agree to adopt and enforce
minimum floodplain-management regulations.6 1 As of 2011, more
than 20,000 communities participated in the program, including
nearly all with significant flood hazards. 62 The program also
identifies and maps the nation's floodplains so as to promote
effective floodplain-management and to inform insurance markets
of actuarial risk. Older structures that pre-date the program (and
the floodplain maps) were often constructed without a full
understanding of the exposed risk. For this reason, Congress
elected to offer subsidized rates for these "existing buildings,"
which are often referred to as Pre-FIRM (Flood Insurance Rate
Map) buildings. Policies for Pre-FIRM buildings now make up
about a quarter of all policies in the NFIP portfolio.63 (That
fraction has steadily declined over the years.)
The federal government could not offer insurance at
affordable rates without the accompanying risk reduction offered
by mandatory floodplain-management standards. Early on those
standards were set to protect against a "1-percent-annual-chance
flood," more commonly (but inaccurately) known as a "100-year
flood". 64 The standard was thought to provide a meaningful level of
protection without saddling owners with extreme mitigation
costs. 6 5
As Oliver Houck wrote in 1985, "[i]t would be hard to find a
program which cuts against more fundamental grains: freedom to
choose where to live and build, freedom from government
restriction (the federal government, at that), and freedom to
maximize a profit from the land, buyer beware."6 6 The more than
61. FED. EMERGENCY MGT. AGENCY, National Flood Insurance Program:
Program
Description,
13
(Aug.
1,
2002),
available
at
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1447-204902156/nfipdescrip_1_.pdf.
62. FED. EMERGENCY MGT. AGENCY, National Flood Insurance Program:
Fact
Sheet,
1
(May
2011),
available
at
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/medialfactsheets/201 1/mitnatl_floodins.pdf.
63. William 0. Jenkins, Jr., FED. EMERGENCY MGT. AGENCY, Oversight
and
Management
of the National Flood Insurance Program Testimony before the Subcommittee
on Housing and Community Opportunity, Committee on Financial Services,
U.S.
House of Representatives (Oct.
20, 2005),
available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/112438.htm1.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The NationalFlood Insurance Program
and Louisiana,60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 159 (1985).
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forty years that the NFIP has muddled through is longer than
many would have expected.
The program's weaknesses became apparent soon after its
implementation. First, the program's subsidized rates and
coverage of properties with repeated loss encouraged owners to
remain in their risky locations. When rebuilding, many owners did
not even redesign their structures to make them safer.
Government grants intended to encourage such improvements
seldom provided enough; and owners, who could continue their
coverage at subsidized rates, understandably took a pass. Second,
because the program was not designed to be actuarially sound, it
sometimes lost money.67 And in the last ten years, it lost a lot.
After a parade of storms, including hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Ike,
and Sandy, the NFIP is now $24 billion in debt.6 8 Third, the NFIP
has continually struggled to provide timely and accurate floodplain
maps. The reasons range from difficulties in coordinating with
private contractors and local governments to external pressures
imposed by developers and realty trade groups. 69
Many infirmities in the law can be traced to the fact that
FEMA, the supervising agency, must ultimately rely on other
parties to fulfill many of the program's goals.7 0 In the fall 2005,
just weeks after hurricanes Katrina and Rita, a senior official at
the Department of Homeland Security put it this way:
FEMA's role is principally one of establishing policies and standards
that others generally implement on a day-to-day basis and providing
financial and management oversight of those who carry out those
day-to-day responsibilities. These responsibilities include ensuring
that property owners who are required to purchase flood insurance
do so, enforcing flood plain management and building regulations,
selling and servicing flood insurance policies, and updating and
maintaining the nation's flood maps. 71
In 2012, a reform act sponsored by Congresswomen Judy
Biggert and Maxine Waters eliminated most of the troublesome
subsidies, while leaving the other structural problems intact. 72 By

67. Christine M. McMillan, Federal Flood Insurance Policy: Making
Matters Worse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 471, 495 (2007).
68. Alex Newman, Fixing the National Flood Insurance Program, in Three
Charts, ALJAZEERA
AMERICA
(Oct.
27,
2013),
available at

http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2013/10/fixing-thenationalfloodinsuranceprograminthreechartsO.html.
69. Theodoric Meyer, Using Outdated Data, FEMA Is Wrongly Placing
Homeowners
in
Flood
Zones,
PROPUBLICA,
available
at:
http://www.propublica.org/article/using-outdated-data-fema-is-wronglyplacing-homeowners-in-flood-zones(last accessed Mar. 20, 2014).
70. McMillan, supra note 68, at 489.
71. Jenkins, supra note 63.
72. Jessica Grannis, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR., Analysis of How the
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 May Affect State and Local Adaptation
Efforts,
http://www.georgetowncimate.org/sites/default/files/
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making the NFIP "actuarially sound," the BW-12 removed the
perverse incentive that encouraged people to live in floodplains
and promoted instead a policy of managed retreat. But because the
reform ignored many basic issues of practicality and fairness, a
backlash ensued. 73 In March 2014, Congress reinstated many of
the subsidies BW-12 had removed. 74 But because BW-12 only
authorized the NFIP until 2017 (an arrangement that remains
intact), Congress will be forced to revisit the details of the flood
insurance program in the next three years.75 This offers a unique
opportunity to re-evaluate BW-12's strategy and build something
more politically and economically sustainable. Our general
principles on climate retreat, we think, should help steer this
discussion.
b. Elements of the 2012 Reform
BW-12 had76 modified the NFIP in three important ways by
affecting subsidies, mapping, and hazard mitigation.7 7 Most
notably, the act removed subsidized rates on certain classes of
structures and allows premiums to increase gradually (25% per
year) until actuarial rates were achieved.78 For the 81% of
policyholders who already paid actuarial rates, nothing would
change.7 9 Owners
of pre-FIRM multi-family
dwellings
(representing 4% of the total), would also not see any immediate
increase.80 But owners of commercial properties, vacation homes,
and severe repetitive loss properties (including primary
residences) would see 25% annual increases until the true risk
premium was reached.81 That category represents about 5% of all
insured properties, or 252,851 existing policies. 82 Owners of preAnalysis%20ofo20the%2OFlood%20Insurance%20Reform%2Act%20f/o2020
12.pdf (accessed July 27, 2013).
73. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, PopularFlood Insurance Law Is the Target
TiMES
(Jan.
28,
2014),
Political Parties,
N.Y
of
Both
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/us/politics/popular-flood-insurancelaw-is-target-of-both-political-parties.html(describing "enthusiastic bipartisan
effort to gut [the Biggert-Waters Act]").
74. H.R. 3370, 113th Cong., 2d Sess. (2014).
75. Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 3(a)(2) (2014).
76. Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 958 (2012).
77. Grannis, supra note 73.
78. Assn. of State Floodplain Managers, Summary of Content: BiggertWaters Flood Ins. Reform Act of 2012, July 6, 2012, available at
http://www.floods.org/acefiles/documentlibrary/2012_NFIPReform/2012_NFIPReformAct
ASFPM_-SummaryofContents.pdf.
79. FED. EMERGENCY MGT. AGENCY, Who Will Be Impacted by Rate
Increases Nationally under Section 205? (Dec. 31, 2012), available at
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1910-250454019/bwl2_impact_fs_04092013_natl_508.pdf.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.

710

The John Marshall Law Review

[ 47:695

FIRM properties used as primary homes would retain their
subsidies until the property was sold to a new owner or the policy
was allowed to lapse. That category represents 10% of the total, or
578,312 policies.83
In addition, BW-12 made much needed changes to the
mapping NFIP's project. The act reestablished the Technical
Mapping Advisory Council. The Council's main task is to provide
recommendations to FEMA about how to update and improve the
FIRM process.84 Other tasks included finding ways to streamline
and improve the cost-effectiveness of the mapping process, data
collection, distribution, and dissemination.8 5
The other mapping component of the act included the
National Flood Mapping Program. The act required that flood
maps show 100-year and 500-year floodplains for all populated
areas, areas of possible growth, and areas with risk behind levees
or below dams.8 6 Reforms also required that new flood maps use
the most accurate topography and elevation data available, as well
as require new ground elevation data when necessary.87 BW-12
also required FEMA to notify property owners when the properties
are included in the floodplain or removed from it. Additionally,
Congressional members are to be notified when their districts or
states are affected by a map change.8 8
BW-12 authorized four hundred million dollars for flood
mapping from 2013-2017 and limitations are removed on state
contributions for updated flood mapping. Finally, the Act required
a study on federal interagency coordination on flood mapping,
including collection and utilization of data among all
governmental users.89

As for mitigation programs, the BW-12 consolidated programs
for Repetitive Flood Claims (RFC), Severe Repetitive Loss (SRL),
and Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) and appointed ninety
million dollars per year to fund them.90 Areas of "residual risk"
meant areas "behind a levee or near a dam or other flood control
structure; and that would be subject to flooding in the base flood if
not for the protective structure". 9' Owners of property in residual
risk areas were not required to purchase flood insurance. 92

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Assn. of State Floodplain Managers, supra note 69, at 2-3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2.

Reform of the Reform
In the spring of 2014, Congress blunted the impact of BW-12
by repealing its most dramatic changes and delaying most
"actuarial" reform until 2017. This turn of tide can be credited, at
least in part, to Hurricane Sandy.
President Obama signed BW-12 on July, 6, 2012, one month
into hurricane season. In states outside the Gulf of Mexico's storm
belt, public debate had been limited. But that changed after
Sandy, the largest Atlantic hurricane on record,9 3 plowed into the
Eastern Seaboard. As recovery crews in New York and New Jersey
appeared regularly on the evening new, Americans everywhere
gave insurance reform a second look.94 Around that time FEMA
also began rolling out its updated flood maps, showing
homeowners and developers what "actuarially sound" premiums in
accurately defined flood plains would really mean. For
homeowners in pre-FIRM structures or in newer homes now
drawn into flood plains, the news was alarming. In Queens, New
York, residents recovering from Sandy worried that a $458 annual
premium could explode to $15,000.95 Residents of Plaquemines
Parish, Louisiana, who are still rebuilding after Hurricane Isaac
(2012), were bracing for increases of up to $28,000 per year.96
Preliminary flood maps in South Hampton Roads, Virginia, were
expected to increase insurance premiums there up to 850%.97
Instinctively,
politicians
began
backing
away.
Congresswoman Maxine Waters, the law's co-author, expressed
outrage over the expected increases and (rather unconvincingly)
93. Danielle Ivory, Hurricane Sandy's $180 Million Federal Tab Tops Cost
2012),
2,
(Dec.
POST
WASH.
Irene,
of
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/hurricane-sandys-180million-federal-tab-tops-cost-of-irene/2012/12/02/940f7fb4-39a6-11e2-8a97363b0f9a0ab3_story.html.
94. See Scott Gurian, Putting Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act
in Perspective, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Nov.
12,
2013),
available at
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/11/11/explainer-putting-biggertwaters-flood-insurance-reform-act-in-perspective (discussing the BiggertWaters Reform Act and the effect it will have on homeowners affected).
95. See Jenny Anderson, Outrageas Homeowners Preparefor Substantially
Higher Flood Insurance Rates, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/nyregion/overhaul-and-a-hurricane-haveflood-insurance-rates-set-for-huge-increases.html?pagewanted=all (discussing
the drastic increases in flood insurance premiums and the local reactions to
these increases).
96. See Juliet Linderman, Parish Presidents Band Together to Fight
against Biggert-Waters, Flood Insurance Rate Hikes, NEW ORLEANS TIMESPICAYUNE
(May
17,
2013),
available
at
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/05/parish-presidentsba
nd_togethe.html (discussing the reaction of homeowners when confronted with
the incredible increase in the cost of flood insurance).
97. Sarah Kleiner Varble, Cost of Flood Insurance Poised to Rise for
Thousands, VIRGINIAN
PILOT
(Sept.
24,
2013),
available at
http://hamptonroads.com/2013/09/cost-flood-insurance-poised-rise-thousands.
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blamed the problem on FEMA.98 Governor Chris Christie invoked
the urgency of storm recovery. "[Floisting the additional burden of
a flood-insurance rate increase on home and business owners as
currently proposed," he wrote, in a letter to Congress, "would be
financially devastating."99
Waters later maintained that no one in Congress ever
anticipated the "harm and heartache" the reform act would cause.
But the claim is dubious.100 In 2008, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO)-Congress's own research servicepredicted exactly this kind of crisis if lawmakers chose to remove
flood insurance subsidies without properly providing for the
transition. 101 Fearing that soaring premiums would drive
homeowners out of the market, the GAO recommended
ameliorating efforts, including expanded mitigation efforts and
subsidized premiums based on financial need. 102 But these
recommendations, both of which would have cost more money,
were not included in the final bill.
Pressures from local and state governments, interest groups
like the National League of Cities, National Association of
Homebuilders,. the National Association of Realtors, and
homeowners led to the 2014 reform. The governments and private
interests feared the ramifications of increased homeowner flood
insurance policies under BW-12.
The opponents of BW-12
supported new legislation that "would help stop, slow or reverse
the skyrocketing flood insurance premium rate increases called for
by BW-12." 03 Opponents wanted new legislation that would take
steps to resolve unintended consequences of BW-12, including
premium spikes and impacts on the sale, construction, and
remodeling of homes across the nation.104 That legislative fix,
called the Homeowners Flood Insurance Affordability Act
98.

Kathleen Pender, Backlash over Changes in Flood Insurance, S.F.
(Nov.
16,
2013),
available
at
http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/Backlash-over-changes-inflood-insurance-4988143.php.
99. Gurian, supra note 84 (quoting Gov. Chris Christie).
100. Laura Vecsey, Coastal Area Residents Stunned by Flood Insurance
Rate
Hikes,
FORBES
(Oct.
22,
2013),
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/zillow/2013/10/22/coastal-area-residents-stunnedby-flood-insurance-rate-hikes (quoting Rep. Maxine Waters).
101. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Options for Addressing the Financial
Impact of Subsidized Premium Rates on the National Flood Insurance
Program (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/283427.pdf
(hereinafter "GAO Report").
102. Id. at 23.
103. NAVL LEAGUE OF CITIES, Federal Advocacy Update (Feb. 28, 2014),
available at
http://www.nlc.org/influence-federal-policy/resources/federaladvocacy-update/federal-advocacy-update-week-ending-february-28-2014.
104. Nat1 Assoc. of Homebuilders, It's All About Boosting Your Bottom Line,
https://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?genericContentlD=221337&print=true
(last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
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(HFIAA),105 eased through both houses of Congress and was signed
into law on March 21, 2014.106
The HFIAA does not quite repeal BW-12, but it makes
significant changes. The Act, for instance, retainsthe 25% increase
in annual premiums for certain properties, namely, non-primary
residences, businesses, and those marked by "severe repetitive
loss." 107 But for properties outside those categories, the Act reduces
annual increases to no more than 18%.108
The HFIAA also
reinstates the NFIP's original
grandfathering provision, meaning homes that complied with
previous flood maps cannot be charged higher premiums when
maps are updated to reveal greater risk.109 It also repeals the
provision that required an immediate hike to actuarial levels when
a homeownership changes hands. 110 The HFIAA retains the "best
science" mapping reforms of BW-12. But it strengthens community
participation in the mapping process by supplementing notice and
comment procedures and reimbursing individuals for successful
appeals of mapping designations.111 The HFIAA also recognizes a
wider range of sensible "flood proofing" techniques (beyond
elevation of the structure) in order to accommodate the realities of
older urban buildings.112 BW-12 had required FEMA to study how
to increase participation in the insurance program as well has how
to make it more affordable. The HFIAA gives FEMA a two-year
deadline and increases the funding for that work from $750,000 to
$3 million.113
BW-12 re-authorized the National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP) through September 30, 2017.114 Before BW-12, the NFIP
had been operating under stopgap extensions and shutdown twice
for several weeks.115 Under HFIAA the NFIP must still be

105. Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 1(a) (2014).
106. Bruce Alpert, President Obama Signs Flood Insurance Bill into Law,
NEW
ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE
(March
21,
2014),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssfl2014/03/do-not~run-presidentobama_s
ig.html.
107. Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 5(b)(5) (2014); Dan Farber, Sea Level Rises,
Premiums Not So Much, LEGAL PLANET BLOG (March 24, 2014), http://legalplanet.org/2014/03/24/sea-level-rises-premiums-not-so-much/.
108. Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 5(b)(5) (2014); Farber, supra note 108; Alpert,
President Obama Signs Flood Insurance Bill, supra note 107.
109. Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 4(a) (2014); Farber, supra note 108; Alpert,
President Obama Signs Flood Insurance Bill, supra note 107.
110. Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 3(a)(1) (2014); Farber, supra note 108; Alpert,
President Obama Signs Flood Insurance Bill, supra note 107.
111. Pub. L. No. 113-89, §§ 18(a), 30 (2014).
112. Id. at § 26.
113. Id. at § 16(c).
114. Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100203(b), 126 Stat. 958 (2012).
115. See
NAT'L
Assoc.
OF
REALTORS,
Legislative Analysis,
http://www.realtor.org/topics/national-flood-insurance-programnfip/legislative-analysis (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
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reauthorized by 2017.116 With a deficit of more than $24 billion, it
seems inevitable that in the near future we will see new proposals
to make the NFIP actuarially sound and, in some cases, to
encourage managed retreat. That's desirable. An examination of
what BW-12 got right and what it got wrong can help researchers
and policy makers shape that debate.
3. Evaluation
a. BW- 12 before the HFIAA
How does the BW-12 look in light of our six principles for
managed retreat? There are a few wins, some big losses, and
matches yet to be determined. In the final analysis, the 2012
reform was much more about controlling government losses than
reducing public risk. While saving taxpayer money is a good thing,
reforms should have been led by concerns for public safety,
followed by responsible efforts toward program solvency.
Taking up our first principle on the importance of federal
participation, BW-12 too often left FEMA on the sidelines. Local
enforcement of floodplain-management regulations and building
codes have always been the weak spot in the NFIP's risk-reduction
strategy. And, despite mandates that most owners in floodplains
carry insurance, the program has never had deep enough
penetration
among
at-risk
owners.
Indeed,
NFIP's
implementation, as Houck once noted, is exactly the opposite of
what you would want-strong in lower risk communities and soft
in higher-risk communities.117 With a strapped budget and weak
authority, FEMA can hardly be blamed for this contradiction. And
BW-12 did little to change it.
Phasing out subsidized premiums would surely have spurred
retreat in some areas, but there is no reason to suggest retreat
would be uniform, well-conceived, or "managed." People hit with
high premiums would have to make choices. Those who could afford
it would continue to pay. Others would move. But many, we suspect,
would have stayed put and dropped out of the insurance market
entirely, leaving the cost of the next bailout to taxpayers. In
neighborhoods where the cost of insurance makes houses unsalable,
housing markets would have collapsed and owners would have seen
the value of their largest family asset disappear overnight.
Communities and social relationships might have frayed or
disintegrated. Neighborhoods on higher ground might have seen
their populations suddenly increase, with few resources to manage
the influx.
On a positive note, BW-12 did add heft to federal mapping
requirements, an elaboration of federal responsibility that brings us
116.
117.

Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 3(a)(2) (2014).
Houck, supra note 66, at 158.
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to the second principle, concerning the use of sound science and risk
communication techniques. Accurate and current flood maps are
vital to effective risk-mitigation strategies. By insisting on an
expert-driven advisory council and use of the most accurate
elevation data, the act opened the door for the use of climate
projections in developing new maps. Such a move, which has never
before happened, would instantly bring projected climate impacts
into the local land-use decisions of thousands of American
communities. From the perspective of climate adaptation, this
opportunity is the most significant part of the act.
Still, we must remain cautious. We doubt, for instance, that
FEMA, on its own, will be able to meet the demand for sciencebased information-particularly climate-based information-and
technical assistance. Without deeper relationships with agencies
studying climate (for instance, NASA, NOAA, and the EPA),
FEMA could easily be overwhelmed. In addition, decision-making
tools used by FEMA continue to be overly reliant on benefit-cost
analysis with too little precaution built in to acknowledge
uncertainty. Benefit-cost analysis does not account for the
uncertain but real consequences of climate change. In turn, we
fear that the rigidity of benefit-cost analysis will inhibit sensible
climate change retreat and mitigation-based projects .
Our third principle, emphasizing robust public participation,
was essentially ignored in the Biggert-Waters reform. There was no
new opportunity for the public to engage in planning issues related
to retreating or receiving communities. The expert-driven mapping
process, which we otherwise like, did not formally involve
community members as participants. And the public debate over the
Biggert-Waters bill virtually ignored the effects of skyrocketing
premiums on certain communities.
BW-12 ignored the needs of socially vulnerable populations as
well. Many floodplain communities, in suburban Sacramento, the
rural Bread Basket, or coastal Louisiana are not the playgrounds of
the rich, but the working-class neighborhoods whose low property
values attracted and maintained residents over time. The NFIP did
not serve these communities well by creating perverse incentives for
them to stay put without making responsible investments in
structural mitigation. It did not serve them well by turning a blind
eye to lax local enforcement of zoning rules and building codes, or by
ignoring the importance of current and accurate mapping.
But cutting subsidies adds only insult to injury. The strategy
could lead to sudden instability in local housing markets and push
financially strapped owners out of the insurance market altogether,
increasing their vulnerability. Delaying implementation, the
approach now being debated in Congress, would do little to solve the
actual problem and could discourage policyholders from taking risk
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mitigation measures.118 The better solution would be to offer
premium discounts (or, alternatively, vouchers) low-income
households and to create a generous loan and grant program to
encourage risk mitigation."19 In more extreme cases, buyouts
should be considered. It simply makes no sense to foist the costs of
bad government policy on the backs of stressed out homeowners.
Our fifth and sixth principles both involve attention to
unintended consequences. We want policy makers to involve
receiving communities into retreat-based efforts. We think it
crucial that incentives to relocate be undertaken so as not to
compromise resilience efforts or carbon reductions in other
communities. BW-12 is silent on these issues, relying instead on
one braying market signal-increased insurance premiums-to do
the work.
b. BW-12 after the HFIAA
The HFIAA is not so much a reform of the program as it is a
retrenchment. Still we have some brief points to make. To no one's
surprise, the HFIAA continues to keep FEMA and other federal
actors on the sidelines. Without better code enforcement,
mitigation assistance, and market penetration, price signals can
only go so far. Congress should be praised for preserving annual
premium increases (established in BW-12) of 25% for commercial
properties, vacation homes, and properties marked by severe
repetitive loss. Congress wins points for expanding community
involvement in the mapping process. But it will be up to FEMA to
maintain the delicate balance between honoring public
participation and defending the use of "best science." The HFIAA
is correctly concerned with the financial hardship that less
affluent homeowners faced under BW-12. The 18% limit on
individual properties, the return to grandfathering, the return to
portable subsidies (in the event of property transfer), and the
premium refunds for higher payments since 2012 will all lessen
the economic burden of thousands of households.
These changes seem calculated to appeal to the middle class
more than the poor. Flat limits on premium hikes are by nature
regressive: on the margin they benefit wealthier households more.
In addition, low-income households are much more likely to
rent.120 Rental properties are not covered by the 18% cap, but
118. Carolyn Kousky & Howard Kunreuther, Addressing Affordability in the
available at
National Flood Insurance Program (Aug. 2013),
http://www.rff.org/rffldocuments/RFF-IB-13-02.pdf (issue brief by Resources
for the Future and the Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes
Center).
119. See id. (discussing the affordability and the feasibility of the program);
GAO Report, supra note 91, at 23.
120. Joint Center for Housing Studies, America's Rental Housing: Evolving
(2013),
3
at
Needs
and
Markets
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rather seem governed by the 25% cap that remains in place for
commercial properties.121 The effects of these policies on lowincome populations should be watched carefully. The HFIAA, in
fact, requires FEMVA to review premium effects on "residences"
(which we think should be interpreted to include rental properties
as well as owner-occupied homes) and report affordability concerns
to Congress.122

While we commend Congress's concern for affordability, we
don't pretend this fix is perfect, or sustainable in the long term. A
better approach would have been to scale premium hikes to a
property owner's ability to pay, with modifications to addresses
rental properties as well. Or Congress could have left BW-12
intact, but added a subsidy program, granting affordability
vouchers to lower-income households or landlords serving lowerincome communities to be used to pay part of an increased
premium. The subsidy, however structured, would have to be
phased out over some reasonable time in order to encourage people
mitigate or eventually retreat.
This brings us to most significant criticism of the HFIAA: it
does little to reduce physical flood risk or to provide the means for
needy households to mitigate or retreat. Those hard policy choices
have instead been put off until 2017.
4. Recommendations for Reauthorizationin 2017
The failures in BW-12 and the HFIAA can almost all be
traced to a single mistake. When Congress contemplated changes
to the pre-2012 NFIP, it was not thinking in terms of designing
affordable and managed retreat. It was stanching a hemorrhagea flow of billions of dollars in red ink pouring out of a subsidized
insurance program. But the nation needed more than a tourniquet.
It needed a long-term strategy focused on not only hedging loss,
but on increasing community resilience. As NFIP reauthorization
approaches in 2017, lawmakers must put community resilience
first. Any insurance reform must include retreat-based strategies.
But those strategies must go beyond simple price signals. A fair
and effective retreat-based strategy would expand the role of
government monitoring and enforcement, remain committed to the
best science (while arming agencies with the means to adequately
interpret that science and act upon it through appropriate
decision-making processes), expand opportunities for public
involvement, and carefully address affordability issues to make
sure that housing markets do not collapse and that households
have incentives to stay in the insurance market. FEMA should be

http://www.jchs.harvard.edulsites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/jchs americas-rental_
housing_2013_1-O.pdf.
121. Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 5(b)(5) (2014); BW-12, at § 100204 (2).
122. Id. at § 29.
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encouraged to anticipate migration flows and work with local
communities to accommodate such relocation.
V. CONCLUSION
For most of its history, FEMA has been unable, and
occasionally unwilling, to address property loss in the long term.
Instead the agency has focused on the prompt bail-out and the
quick fix. But in an era of soaring claims and and rising seas, that
strategy cannot be sustained. The system needs reform.
On a positive note, the federal government should be praised
for assuming a more active role in retreat-based initiatives. The
NDRF is a starting point for communities to begin thinking about
how to truly address their reoccurring disaster issues. For the
first time through the NDRF, FEMA conveys to the public that
disaster recovery planning is as important as disaster response
planning. However, FEMA missed an opportunity in not providing
possible retreat-based projects when implementing their disaster
recovery plans. Pre-disaster planning is the best time for
communities to consider these important decisions; not when
community officials are knee-deep in floodwaters.
On the key issue of flood insurance, Congress has short-suited
FEMA-and the American public--once again. BW-12, while
correct in emphasizing actuarial soundness, did not sufficiently
consider the effect that skyrocketing flood insurance rates and the
effect it would have on socially vulnerable communities. Resulting
premium hikes seemed likely to drive some low-income owners out
of the insurance market, break up cohesive neighborhoods, and
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cause a housing bust in coastal communities.
repealed the most dramatic changes introduced by BW-12. But
that left the insurance program in most ways back to where it was
before 2012. Real reform was postponed until 2017. All this is a
debacle to be sure. But the silver lining is that lawmakers have
nearly three years to put something better in its place. It's time to
get to work.

